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September 1997: I was a field service technician employed by a Queen's Award winning British engineering export company sent to install printing machinery in a supposedly new customer's factory in Yemen. The new customer turned out to be Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s terrorist cell's front company called YemPak (Yemen-Pakistan abbreviation), located inside an existing customer's headquarters compound in Taiz, 17-miles south of Al Qaidah town. KSM's hosts and financiers were the British allied, US supplied, multi-billion dollar Hayel Saeed Anam (HSA) Group - now based in Dubai. My employer at the time, operating with a Royal seal of approval, was my parent's company JM Heaford Limited. They, my parents, came out of retirement to send me to Yemen in 1997 despite strong government advice not to go there. US Ambassador to Yemen (1997-01) Barbara Bodine said:

"When I got there in 1997, there was already an Al Qaeda presence. We knew about it.
The Yemenis knew about it. Everyone knew about it.... these people were primarily foreign nationals.
One of the best ways to describe the presence is that they were largely warehousing lower-level people
in peripheral areas" - PBS: How Al Qaeda Grew in Yemen

CIA operator Gary Harrington described Yemen in 1998/99 as an 'Al Qaeda' R&R (Rest and Recreation) destination - YouTube interview

By arrangement of HSA's managing director Saeed Alrobaidi, aka the Chief, I was vetted over dinner at my hotel in Taiz by Yousef. The next morning the Chief introduced me to the Engineer (KSM) before his general manager Mohamed took me to an unscheduled meeting one mile from Al Qaidah town - a recruitment interview I cut short before it'd begun. Those meetings occurred after KSM's Pakistani chemical engineers asked me about visiting New York as tourists. I repeated a warning I'd given to a customer in Toronto on 12 June 1997 after flying there from Boston's Logan airport: I expected the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bomb group trying again but next time using a hijacked plane departing Logan airport as a missile. My advice was not to visit the WTC and to resist any hijacking attempts, even highlighting box-cutters as an easily carried and potentially leathal weapon.

On 8 January 2020 my old friend and workmate David Dean killed himself by drowning in Lake Hartwell, Georgia USA. He was also my ex-employer JM Heaford Ltd's former US sales agent who I believe setup the machine sale to Yemen, knowing it was for KSM's front company. His disappearance, clearly a suicide, occurred two days after I'd accused him on twitter of links to CIA contractor Billy Waugh, saying Dean 'set up the machine sale for the Al Qaeda front company in Yemen'. In his 2004 autobiography Billy Waugh admitted working in Yemen during the 1990s with 'Al Qaeda operators intent on attacking the USA' . In December 2019 I'd found evidence that Dean and Waugh served together in Vietnam, likely a cross over between Dean's 101st Airborne and Waugh's MACV-SOG service at the battle of Hamburger Hill in May 1969.

I’m documenting my experiences so my testimony and the supporting evidence I've presented can be acted upon. I declined a 9 March 2018 9/11 Military Commission invitation to interview from US Pentagon based investigators because they were working for KSM's nephew's defence attorneys and wouldn't discuss my witness status. British security services are spying on and targeting me for retribution, but refuse to acknowledge my reports or investigate my claims. Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, Parliament's Intelligence & Security Committee and the US Embassy London have all been formally informed of my experiences in 1997 Yemen, via my MP Sir Graham Brady on 27 March 2017.

Entirely seperately I deployed to Afghanistan with the British army in summer 2012, a vehicle mechanic working in Camp Bastion's light vehicles workshop. I did many airfield guard duties and five top-cover vehicle patrols too. My experiences included protecting opium harvesting and processing, refusing illegal orders, using a civilian human shield against a possible IED, witnessing hundreds of millions of £££ of procurement corruption and fatal command incompetence. Detailed reports on the Afghan Reports tab.